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12. European Surveillance Assemblages: 









The concept of the ‘surveillance assemblage’ can be applied to the governance 
of practices of data-exchange, both at the level of the European Union as well as 
that within the individual Member States. In line with the argument of Johnston 
and Shearing (2003) that plural security practices have emerged widely, data can 
be interlinked and shared at a variety of levels by a substantial number of 
different actors, who may function in the context of a highly differentiated 
governance system. At the same time, it can be argued that criminal justice 
governance is transforming into a remote crime control mechanism, where 
gradually – instead of territorial patrol and physical encounters between police 
and citizens – law enforcement organizations compose collages of deviant 
(future) conduct. The popularization of the precautionary logic – in internal as 
well as external security environments – has encouraged wide acceptance of 
surveillance and mass-data gathering for the purpose of preventing crime, 
terrorism or military conflict. Through preventive monitoring, social ordering 
and mental disciplining (Foucault 1995; Haggerty and Ericson 2000; Zedner 
2006; Elden 2003: 242; Lyon 2003), law enforcement can seek to deliver and 
distribute safety in a more efficient manner, as the sector can seek to limit its 
focus on serious criminal offences and public order issues. At the same time, 
however, the legitimacy of this managerially driven focus may come under 
pressure when viewed from the perspective of equal justice distribution (Van 
Buuren 2009). 
 From a criminal justice governance perspective, a few observations can be 
made about the emergence of a surveillance complex in Europe: 1) at the 
national and European level, a range of surveillance instruments has been coined 
which enable the law enforcement arena to gather, store and analyze data about 
citizens in order to control crime and terrorism; 2) these organizational 
surveillance ‘nodes’ are aggregated, concatenated and even fused into a larger 
surveillance complex which is jointly operated within the European Union; 3) 
the interoperability of surveillance nodes in the Member States allows for a 
large-scale sharing of information about European citizens which in turn flexes 
the margins for storage, use and interpretation of high volumes of data; 4) the 
rise of technological means and the interface with the military world have 
enlarged the surveillance potential; 5) the encouragement of multi-disciplinary 
co-operation within these agencies has nourished the erosion of fire-walls 
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between the different agencies, gradually loosening the hitherto applicable 
information regimes; and 6) the enlargement of the mandate of existing agencies 
such as Europol and the creation of new agencies has expanded the counter-
terrorism and intelligence potential, furthering the application of the 
precautionary surveillance of terrorism, crime and deviance. 
 Our main contention is that the European Union, which is in a position to 
initiate, facilitate, finance and implement surveillance instruments, is in the 
process of developing itself into a supernode, which is tentacled by smaller but 
powerful nodes that interlink public and private actors throughout the Member 
States through surveillance systems. Instead of drawing a sharp distinction 
between ‘surveillance nodes’ (assemblages, networks) on the one hand, and a 
Panopticon that is centrally operated by one powerful actor, we prefer to define 
surveillance as a continually changing theatre of activity, spurred on by the 
sheer Utopian dream of making societies maximally controllable. Neither will 
we dwell on the distinction between mass surveillance and targeted surveillance. 
Our emphasis is more descriptive than theoretical, and also more focused on the 
evolution of several smaller and larger surveillance practices, that sometimes 
compete and at other times seem to neatly fold into each other. Also, we seek to 
accentuate that surveillance has gone adrift, like a larger technocratic instrument 
which can no longer be controlled by one single actor. Finally, our emphasis is 
on analyzing how the European Union as a security actor has been caught by the 
logic of prevention and seeks to expand its recently adopted role of security 
actor through surveillance measures.  
 In the course of this chapter, we seek to further unpeel the role of 
surveillance systems in preventive security governance, and we will transpose it 
to shifting patterns in security governance as well as to the European policy-
making level. Moreover, we will seek to clarify how vocabularies and 
conceptualizations in national and international discourses on security influence 
– or even bedevil – each other. 
 
 
2. Preventive Security Governance through Surveillance 
 
The concept of ‘surveillant assemblage’ was introduced by Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987) and further developed by Haggerty and Ericson (2000). In the context of 
our analysis, it provides a conceptual tool for the analysis of data-gathering and 
information across Europe. ‘Surveillance’ is understood by us as watching over, 
i.e. monitoring the behaviour and movement of persons, goods and systems. 
Surveillance includes a range of measures, exercised by public and private 
authorities, and is considered to enhance objective and subjective security. As 
such, surveillance has become closely intertwined with security. Gill (2006: 28) 
writes – comparably but more extensively – that global surveillance is argued to 
be an intrinsic part of the general economic restructuring of capitalism, and that 
‘security intelligence processes’ are ‘essentially a sub-set of the more general 
surveillance that constitutes contemporary governance. Thus, since intelligence 
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is one of the two defining components of surveillance, and, in turn governance, 
then security intelligence is one of the defining components of security 
governance.’ 
 Our discussion does not merely focus on data-systems which are widely used 
in European states and at the level of the European Union itself, but also on the 
adjacent (and interrelated) practices of de-centralized, networked, transnational 
data-processing and surveillance, which may not fall within the delineated lines 
of accountability (Gill 2006: 45). Ericson (2007: 1) observed an ‘intensification 
of security measures’ through an incremental series of legal transformations, as 
well as through ‘innovative surveillance technologies and networks’. Below, we 
seek to illustrate this development by giving some examples. Closed-circuit 
television (CCTV), for instance, has been introduced in several environments 
(European Parliament 2009: 7; Hempel and Topfer 2009: 27-34). Face 
recognition has been proposed, for instance by Interpol, and in some instances 
has been introduced at local and international levels of security governance; 
fingerprint controls and facial recognition are and will be introduced at border 
entry points, allowing for the matching of personal biometric information with 
travel watch lists.1 
 Except for the growing acceptance of methods of surveillance such as data 
matching,2 data mining,3 and profiling, there has been a widespread introduction 
of smart cards, body scans, body-cams, storage and interception of 
telecommunication, the use of GPS for detection purposes, and environmental 
designs. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags and electronic chips 
implanted in goods and vehicles are used as instruments of surveillance, often 
for the purpose of security governance (Ericson 2007: 2; House of Lords 2009: 
17; Rathenau Instituut 2007; Van ’t Hof, 2007). Although not (yet) widely used 
by law enforcement authorities because the information is too fragmented, RFID 
chips can and are used for guiding and monitoring processes such as luggage-
handling. The European Commission announced recommendations and a 
citizens’ summary for the implementation of privacy and data protection 
safeguards for RFID applications. The guidance directs organizations to perform 
privacy impact assessments, apply risk minimization techniques, and inform 
individuals about RFID.4 
                                               
1  Electronic Privacy Information Centre, <http://epic.org/privacy/facerecognition/>. In the 
meantime, automated face-recognition systems have also been introduced in local public 
transport environments. 
2  According to the American Civil Liberties Union ACLU (2004), data-matching is a 
loosely coupled set of techniques to tap into a wide number of data-bases containing 
details on the individual’s behaviour, aggregate the data and scrutinize them en masse for 
criminal or terrorist intentions. See also House of Lords (2009: 14). 
3  Data mining involves the use of mathematically based analytical tools to detect patterns in 
large sets of data with the purpose of predicting certain kinds of behaviour, such as the 
propensity to engage in criminal activity or to purchase particular consumer goods (House 
of Lords 2009: 14). 
4  <http://epic.org>. 
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 National surveillance assemblages as well as international data-exchange 
practices gradually evolve into ‘horizontal’ strategies, whereby de-central i.e. 
local law enforcement authorities can exchange information and intelligence 
with their foreign counterparts in other EU Member States.5 This can be 
illustrated by referring to vehicle registration, a practice which gradually gains 
popularity within law enforcement organizations. 
 Vehicle recognition is extensively discussed in the European Parliament 
report on CCTV (2009: 14):  
 
 ‘In the UK, one of the first major applications of ANPR was launched in 1996, as 
part of the city of London’s defences against the IRA terrorist threat: all vehicles 
entering the City of London had their license plates checked against police databases. 
In 2003 the Home Office drew up plans to extend this for more routine crime 
prevention purposes, and launched a national pilot scheme which involved 300 
officers operating as part of 50 intercept teams across 23 police forces (…) in the first 
nine months 22.8 million vehicle registration marks were read (…) of which 900,000 
(4%) were of immediate interest to the police. Within the resources available, the 
intercept teams stopped 136,857 vehicles (PA Consulting 2004). These stops led to 
the arrest of 10,546 people for offences ranging from burglary to drug related 
offence, and 2611 persons for driving offences. In other words, seventy-five percent 
of the arrests were neither for traffic nor for driving related offences (our emphasis). 
The significance of ANPR is that it integrates a surveillance device, the camera, with 
the police national computer and all of its associated databases. Like open street 
CCTV it targets all under its gaze but greatly enhances its surveillance capacity as it 
creates a major investigative resource of a vehicle’s movements and locations, 
regardless of the status of the driver. As Watson and Walsh, in their Australian 
review of ANPR argue, the British Police have exploited the system’s potential for: 
data mining as a means of building a picture of a person’s (i.e. offender’s) habits and 
lifestyle. The risk in this approach, however, is that profiles of non-offenders can also 
be derived from ANPR databases using data mining techniques (2008:8). The 
Australian Privacy Commissioner noted the British system would soon be collecting 
and storing around 35 million images per day and stated that they planned to keep 
this data for two years. Further, the ANPR data that is collected is not only mined 
and matched with a number of databases, but also then stored for future use. The 
Australian Privacy Commissioner regards this as an expansive and invasive practice.’ 
 
 In short, for law enforcement organizations that seek to co-operate across the 
national borders of EU Member States, a wide range of surveillance possibilities 
has become available for the active monitoring of individuals and commodities. 
Ericson and Haggerty have labeled this the ‘surveillant assemblage’ (see also 
Sheptycki, 2007). Increasingly, a vast volume of data is available to government 
in general and to law enforcement and security agencies in particular, to the 
extent that the physical movement, the decisions, and even the mental state of 
                                               
5  See e.g. the application of the Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 
December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law 
enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union in the form of 
guidelines (Council doc. 16870/08, Brussels, 7 January 2009). 
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each individual is subject to continuous observation. Over a decade ago, Marx 
(1998) referred to this development by arguing that: 
 
 ‘New technologies for collecting personal information which transcend the physical, 
liberty enhancing limitations of the old means are constantly appearing. They probe 
more deeply, widely and softly than traditional methods, transcending barriers 
(whether walls, distance, darkness, skin or time) that historically made personal 
information inaccessible. The boundaries which have defined and given integrity to 
social systems, groups and the self are increasingly permeable. The power of 
governmental and private organizations to compel disclosure (whether based on law 
or circumstance) and to aggregate, analyze and distribute personal information is 
growing rapidly.’  
 
Whether or not international data-gathering practices are subject to ‘horizontal’ 
or ‘vertical’ governance, warning shots have been given that we may be 
‘sleepwalking into a surveillance society’.6 Data which have been gathered by 
different public authorities can be concatenated in a powerful manner, such that 
new knowledge or intelligence may arise from it. The justification for these 
practices is the elevation of security for those individuals and society as a whole, 
mainly through the minimization of risk and uncertainty. The interlinkage 
between surveillance practices and the prevention of terrorism and crime is a 
relatively new one within the realm of European policing. Never before did 
European or intergovernmental security actors such as Europol or SitCen have 
the possibility to gather and analyze information proactively with a view to early 
intervention in illegal markets or radicalization contexts; never before was the 
European Union in such a powerful position to stimulate the interoperability 
between security-enhancing databases, or to finance research on technologically 
advanced surveillance systems. 
 Preventive security governance is an area of activity where the European 
Union can act potently, without upsetting the sovereign Member States that hold 
the monopoly of violence, and thus of coercive powers which are used in the 
context of reactive or repressive security governance. With its encouragement of 
crime and radicalization prevention programmes, the European Union reinforces 
national developments rather than competes with national arenas which cultivate 
preventive security governance through surveillance. According to Ericson, ‘risk 
is the way organizations make sense of their environment and act upon it. 
External sources of harm are converted into organizational risks through 
technologies such as early warning systems, risk profiling, and red flag 
indicators. Internal sources of harm are converted into operational risks through 
technologies such as inspections, audits, reporting procedures, and electronic 
surveillance. Risk management has become engrained in the social imaginary of 
organizations.’ (Ericson 2007: 11). 
                                               
6  UK Information Commissioner Richard Thomas in 2004, quoted in House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution report, Surveillance: Citizens and the State, 2009, HL 
Paper 18-I, p. 5. 
GOVERNING SECURITY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW? 
 220 
 More than ever before, today’s risk societies are preoccupied by a need to 
predict. Unpredictability, uncontrollability and invisibility are gradually defined 
as undesirable practices and thus ruled out from late modern governance 
(Trommel 2009; Sackers 2010). Longing for a safety utopia (Boutellier 2002), 
we have landed in a so-called non-permissive society.7 The tendency to prevent 
disasters, calamities, crises, accidents, crimes and terrorist attacks has influenced 
the transition from reactive to proactive intervention (Den Boer 2010). 
 This preventive logic (also referred to as the ‘precautionary principle’) is not 
new as it has been apparent in ‘high policing’ strategies (Borgers and Van 
Sliedregt 2009), which can be characterized as the gathering of intelligence 
which may lead to a proactive intervention, often without an explicit criminal 
procedure. Scenario’s, risk assessments and intelligence models have become 
part and parcel of accepted working methods for police and military, allowing 
for the prediction of patterns of uncertainty, crimes and security gaps, and 
allowing for a smart and timely intervention. The preventive logic involves a 
transition from accusation to an orientation; a transition from individual risk 
citizens to their environments (social network analysis; money transfers; virtual 
communication); from penal to administrative intervention; and from repression 
to the mental disciplining of citizens. 
 A law enforcement image that presents itself is that of ‘policing by the velvet 
glove’, where physical encounters with the citizens are substituted by electronic 
data-collection (Den Boer and Van Buuren, forthcoming). The gathering of data, 
the conditioning, and the restyling of citizens have become part of a larger 
complex of ‘datawars’. Several police forces have welcomed the introduction of 
(smart) camera’s in public spaces (Sackers 2010: 14), allowing law enforcement 
authorities to keep a constant watch on mobility and flows of traffic, people, 
goods, finances and information. This fits in a new strategy of intelligence-led 
policing which is labeled ‘nodal policing’ and which has – in a rather 
technocratic fashion (Den Boer, forthcoming) – become an accepted modus 
operandi within several law enforcement agencies’.8 
 
 
3. Evolving Surveillance Systems 
 
Surveillance – particularly exercised through electronic i.e. technological 
means – has become an inescapable reality, primarily because governments seek 
to reduce risk by means of preventative control (Zureik and Salter 2005: 1), 
culminating in a ‘risk aversive Panopticon’ (Whitaker 1999: 44). In a few 
decades, spurred on by security crises such as 9/11, the surveillance climate has 
altered dramatically. Below, we seek to illustrate this development by 
highlighting different dimensions of surveillance: its potential, its depth 
(pervasiveness), its application, its finality, its interaction and its effect. 
                                               
7  Quotation from Chief Constable Bernard Welten, 11 March 2010, Public Lecture, VU 
University Amsterdam. 
8  Rapport ‘Politie in Ontwikkeling’, Raad van Hoofdcommissarissen, 2005. 
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Function Creep 
Governments and law enforcement authorities have principally sought to justify 
the introduction of new surveillance measures by arguing that the scrutiny of 
millions of data helps in identifying would-be terrorists. But gradually, anti-
terrorism surveillance measures can also be used for the monitoring and 
registration of minor crimes or public nuisance. Or, ‘(W)hat is developed as an 
anti-crime surveillance device can be redirected against refugees, political 
dissidents, or striking trade unionists. Such technologies are also moving into 
the hands of private, corporate security, which stands outside whatever 
regulation and democratic accountability may constrain state agencies’ 
(Whitaker 1999: 85).9 Moreover, large amounts of data can now cross national 
borders either formally or informally, between public as well as private users 
(Adviescommissie Informatiestromen Veiligheid 2007; Gill 2006: 33). 
 
Penetration of Social and Private Life 
As mentioned previously, practices like data-matching, data-mining and text-
mining have become widely introduced. Whitaker (2006) for instance refers to 
the FBI’s CARNIVOR, which is a super search engine capable of trolling 
through e-mail traffic and flagging communications of interest, e.g. on the basis 
of key word recognition. In Europe, there has been discussion about the well-
known ECHELON system (Whitaker 1999: 93, 105), which, allows SIGINT 
(signals intelligence collection) and operates on behalf of the five signatory 
states (Australia, United States, Canada, United Kingdom and New Zealand). 
ECHELON is capable of (mass) interception and content inspection of telephone 
calls, fax, e-mail and other data-traffic communicated across a range of media 
(radio, microwave, cyber-optic, cellular or satellite).10 
 More pervasive surveillance methods include data-profiling practices, which 
can be based on the collection and sharing of DNA-material and fingerprints.11 
Biometric information systems are thus increasingly woven into existing 
practices and procedures of international police co-operation (Lewis 2005: 97). 
According to the House of Lords (2009: 14), data-profiling is used in the public 
sector ‘to predict a variety of risk patterns in the population, thereby enabling 
public services and law enforcement resources to be appropriately focused. 
Although this process may enable benefits and social services to be targeted 
more accurately and effectively, it may arguably lead to discrimination by 
singling out individuals or social groups for adverse treatment on the basis of 
incorrect or misleading assumptions.’ Profiling is done on the basis of a variety 
of criteria, e.g. race or ethnic group, and used in security settings. 
                                               
9  On the issue of democratic accountability, see Parliamentary Oversight of the Security 
Sector.  
10  For the European Parliament Report on intelligence in general and Echelon in particular  
 (11 July 2001), see: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/echelon/echelon_eur_ 
 parliament.pdf. 
11  For a discussion, see European Parliament Working Document on problem of profiling 
(2008). 
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From Evidence to Intelligence 
As has been noted above, if there is one dimension of information-gathering that 
has changed considerably, it is the moment at which information is collected 
about an individual’s behaviour: the last few decades have seen a steady 
increase of pro-active intelligence gathering (instead of reactive information-
gathering in response to a concrete suspicion concerning the role of an 
individual in a reported crime). Hence, there has been a move from tagging real 
suspicions to possible suspicions. An emergent ‘precautionary logic’ (Ericson 
2007: 25) combined with administrative anxiety about accountability has paved 
the path for more pro-active data-gathering and risk management: ‘While other 
approaches to government seem to yield more uncertainty, governing through 
crime sends a strong signal of certainty. When there is a persistent threat that is 
said to affect the quality of life, or a catastrophic failure in a risk management 
system for which the government is held responsible, criminalization through 
counter-law provides an ending to the political narrative of uncertainty in the 
short term, and perpetuates the myth of governability in the long term.’ (Ericson 
2007: 207). The evolving finality can also be demonstrated in the new 
application potential of the Schengen Information System (SIS), which functions 
in the context of the Schengen Implementing Convention (1990): it allows the 
submission of data which are defined as indicators of future criminal action; 
these data will also be used for counter-terrorism purposes by virtue of the Prüm 
Treaty (2005). 
 
Multiple Users, Shared Information Spaces 
The House of Lords (2009: 15) reminds us that: ‘The role of technology in 
surveillance is pre-eminent and poses formidable regulatory problems. The 
Information Commissioner told us that individuals ‘leave electronic footprints 
behind with the click of mouse, making a phone call, paying with a payment 
card, using ‘joined up’ government services or just walking down a street where 
CCTV is in operation. Our transactions are tracked, our interactions identified 
and our preferences profiled – all with potential to build up an increasingly 
detailed and intrusive picture of how each of us lives our life. This has increased 
the capability for surveillance of the citizen through data collection.’ New 
technology allows for ambient intelligence and ubiquitous computing, enabling 
a total information awareness on the side of government and law enforcement 
authorities, exercised by means of Real Time Intelligence Rooms. A condition 
for this practice is the cultivation of multi-disciplinary co-operation, primarily 
between security agents, but increasingly also between public and private 
agents. It is contended that public authorities organize a co-production (or 
‘conscription’) with private business to enable the construction of a surveillance 
society (ACLU 2004). Air carriers have been included in this public-private 
security co-operation, for instance as a consequence of the Air Carrier Sanctions 
in the Schengen Implementing Agreement or in the context of PNR (see below): 
‘Multiple airlines have admitted turning over the records of their customers’ 
travels to the government. In each case, the information was turned over not to 
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help the government solve a particular crime or track a particular suspect, but in 
order to examine each traveler’s records in the hopes of identifying terrorists by 
detecting ‘suspicious’ patterns in his or her travels – in effect, turning every 
traveler into a suspect (…)’ (ACLU 2004: 10). Private vigilantism thus becomes 
part of the surveillance complex, and it becomes more difficult for customers or 
citizens to distinguish the roles and responsibilities of the surveillance agents. 
 Meanwhile, technology becomes smarter and more sophisticated, for 
instance due to the introduction of swift and massive hard drives and content 
analysis (ACLU 2004: 9). A new generation smart cameras has been introduced 
in several (semi) public spaces, such as shopping malls and railway stations, 
which can register a concentration of people, irregular behaviour (such as 
shouting, pushing), allowing for a direct notification to security agents. Within 
the law enforcement field, netcentric ‘warfare’ as well as rapid automatic 
intervention by means of intelligent technology are close to being applied on a 
vast scale.12 
 
Hybrid Interaction and ‘Interoperability’ 
At the level of the European Union, several instruments have been adopted and 
good practices shared in law enforcement circles which enable the connection 
between public order policing and overt (‘forward intelligence’) as well as 
covert surveillance of audiences, to enable a prognosis of the behaviour of 
political dissidents, football hooligans, mentally deranged people etc., in order to 
prevent riots, or in the worst case, attacks. In the UK, this is called ‘forward 
intelligence’. Moreover, as indicated above, there is an increasing development 
towards authorized access to large national and international databases for police 
and law enforcement authorities, which increases the possibilities for multi-
disciplinary usage of data and data-fusion and which enhances the interaction 
between intelligence-led policing and public order policing. ‘Interoperability’ 
has become the magic wand in European and transnational security 
arrangements. 
 
Internalization of the Gazing Eye 
The effect of total surveillance or total information awareness is that individuals 
are conscious of being continuously watched by state and private authorities, to 
the extent that they discipline themselves mentally. This ‘panopticism’ has 
become a core element of the modernist project. In this regard, Ericson (2007: 
29) noted that ‘The police power is perfected when it results in self-policing 
among members of the population. The liberal social imaginary of the ‘house of 
certainty’ is a house of discipline as self-policing. The individual who knows 
that she is seen through by the surveillant assemblage, who recognizes her 
visibility, will internalize the gaze. That is, she will not only assume 
responsibility for the constraints of power, but will have that power inscribed in 
                                               
12  See ‘Neoconopticon’, Report of the Transnational Institute, 2009 (this report can be 
accessed through http://tni.org/report/neoconopticon). 
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her to the point where she polices others as well as herself.’ The Leviathan-like 
surveillance net is incrementally enlarged through new legislation (not always 
passed by parliament but de-centrally widened by municipal authorities who 
then ‘export’ their new surveillance practice to other cities) to include ever new 
groups of the population, who for reasons of safety, education, health, housing 
or social benefit are made subject of more active monitoring. 
 
 
4. Surveillance in the EU 
 
Security has become one of the essential pillars in the EU polity, particularly 
through the construction and promotion of an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’. This policy domain, previously known as the field of justice and home 
affairs co-operation or the ‘Third Pillar’, has gradually matured since the 
adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, and now encompasses hundreds of 
legal instruments, as well as several action and financing programmes. 
 The development of the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has been 
flanked by wider and more general developments. On the one hand, 
globalization and informatization have reinforced networked (security) 
governance and the commodification of public security (Van Buuren 2009), 
whilst on the other hand, a merging process between internal and external 
security has facilitated the criminalization and ‘securitization’ of migratory 
flows (Bigo 1994). Furthermore, terrorist attacks have sent accelerating 
shockwaves through EU decision-making machinery and has culminated in the 
adoption of several legal instruments which entail deep consequences for 
information-gathering, such as the Passenger Name Record agreement and the 
EU Retention Directive on Telecommunication.  
 Particularly noticeable is the reliance of law enforcement authorities – both 
at the European and the national level – on information, principally gathered and 
dispersed through large data-bases (Van Linde 2002). Examples of European, 
cross-border data-bases that are used by law enforcement authorities (including 
customs and border control authorities) are the VIS (visa information system),13 
SIS I and II14 (Schengen Information System), the CIS (Customs Information 
                                               
13  Access to VIS by law enforcement authorities and Europol is based on Regulation (EG)  
 No 767/2008 of 9 July 2008 (OJ L 218/60, 13.8.2008) and Council Decision 
2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008 (OJ L 218/129, 13.8.2008), for the purpose(s) of 
prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious crime. 
This can only be done when it is deemed necessary, when there are reasonable grounds 
and when the request is expected to substantially contribute to solving the crime, and 
should be performed by means of an electronic request via central access points. Source: 
Lecture Kurt Hager, ERA, 23 April 2009. 
14  Legal basis of SIS II: Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of 20 December 2006 (OJ L 318/4, 
28.12.2006) and Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 (OJ L 205/63, 
7.8.2007) on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen 
Information System. 
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System), and Eurodac15 (fingerprint system for asylum-seekers) and the EIS 
(Europol Information System). Meanwhile, the creation of new data-bases has 
been announced, such as the (interlinking of) national DNA-databases (flowing 
from the Prüm Treaty which was signed in 2005), the creation of a European 
Border Surveillance System (Eurosur)16 and the creation of an entry-exit system 
that registers the entry and exit of all visitors to Europe.17 
 These large data-systems are geared around the principle of verticality, i.e. 
data-input organized inside the Member States and mediated by a central (law 
enforcement) authority. The reason for this is the stronghold of national 
sovereignty: the prime locus of control on law enforcement activity still resides 
with national authorities. A vertical, central, hierarchical system of data-
gathering and exchange suggests that information practices are correctly, 
intelligibly and transparently subjected to national and international data 
protection systems. 
 
Retention of Telecommunications Directive 
A core element of the EU counter-terrorism strategy is the facilitation of 
electronic surveillance (Akdeniz and Walker 2003), which has been formalized 
by means of the EU Directive on the Retention of Telecommunications, which 
was adopted on 15 March 2006.18 Data retention or data preservation generally 
refers to the (temporary) storage of internet traffic, electronic message exchange 
and mobile telephony. This allows governments traffic analysis as well as mass 
surveillance. 
 The Directive requires Member States to ensure that communications 
providers must retain, for a period of between 6 months and 2 years, necessary 
                                               
15  Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000/EC of 11 December 2000 (OJ L 316, 
15.12.2000). Eurodac became operational on 15 January 2003 and is used by all EU 
Member States, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. The EU Council Conclusions 
(11004/07) under the German Presidency recommended access to Eurodac by police and 
law enforcement authorities for the purpose of prevention, detection and investigation of 
terrorist offences and serious criminal offences. It was suggested by Kurt Hager at the 
ERA Conference on 23 April 2009 that around 1100 criminals could be detected by this 
system. 
16  For a report of the European Parliament’s Policy Department C on Citizen’s Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs on Eurosur, see PE 408.295 Briefing Paper ‘An Analysis of the 
Commission Communications on Future Development of Frontex and the Creation of a 
European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur)’, June 2008. The briefing paper opines 
that the evaluation of Frontex falls short of ‘critically assessing the consistence of Frontex 
activities with the fundamental values upheld by the EU.’ 
17  Commission of the European Communities (2008) Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions. Preparing the next steps in border management in the 
European Union. COM (2008) 69 final, Brussels, 13 February 2008. 
18  Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provisions of 
publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications 
networks (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 54). 
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data as specified in the Directive to trace and identify the source of a 
communication; to trace and identify the destination of a communication; to 
identify the date, time and duration of a communication; to identify the type of 
communication; to identify the communication device; to identify the location of 
mobile communication equipment. The data are required to be available to 
competent national authorities in specific cases, ‘for the purpose of the 
investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each 
Member State in its national law’. 
 In its verdict on the 10th of February 2009, the European Court of Justice 
ruled that the Data Retention Directive is founded on an appropriate legal basis, 
correctly adopted on the basis of the EC Treaty and predominantly relating to 
the functioning of the internal market.19 Prior to the adoption of the Directive, 
EU Member States had already introduced measures to oblige service providers 
to retain data. These measures differed substantially however, in view of the 
data to be retained as well as with regard to the data retention periods. This may 
have been the result of the EU Framework Decision, which had been proposed 
in 2004 by France, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In its ruling, the 
ECJ also established that the provisions of the directive are essentially limited to 
the activities of service providers and do not govern access to data or use thereof 
by the police and judicial authorities of the Member States: ‘The measures 
provided for by the directive do not, in themselves, involve intervention by the 
police or law-enforcement authorities of the Member States. Those issues, which 
fall in principle within the domain covered by police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, have been excluded from the provisions of the directive.’20 It 
has however been claimed that access to these data is provided to law 
enforcement authorities without a warrant and for crimes that are not necessarily 
serious in nature.21 For the access of law enforcement authorities to e.g. mobile 
phone records, additional measures are mostly to be found within the realms of 
the individual Member States. 
 Guild (2010: p. 3) explains that the EU Directive on Data Retention ran ‘into 
serious trouble in the national courts in the EU’, also because since the ruling of 
the ECJ, the Romanian Supreme Court ruled against the national implementing 
legislation in October 2009, and the German Constitutional Court struck down 
its national implementing legislation on 2 March 2010; in both cases the 
intrusive nature in combination with the individual right to privacy was at the 
heart of the argument. Guild (2010, p. 3):  
 
 ‘The German court was particularly concerned about the purpose of the collection 
and the storage of the data, which was precautionary in nature, that is to say not 
directed at events that had already taken place but at some future possible action or 
                                               
19  Judgement of the Court of Justice in Case C-301/06, Ireland v. Parliament and Council. 
20  Judgement of the Court of Justice in Case C-301/06, Ireland v. Parliament and Council, 
par. 82. 
21  <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance#Mobile_phone_tracking>. 
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event. It found that retention of such data must not lead to the possibility to virtually 
reconstruct any activities of citizens’. 
 
PNR agreement 
Since 2003, USA authorities have demanded on-line access to the Passenger 
Name Records which are kept by European flight carriers on flights to the USA. 
By screening the data, the American and Canadian authorities22 seek to decrease 
the possibility that (would-be) terrorists enter their territories from Europe. The 
PNR’s comprise several data, such as name, date of birth and telephone 
numbers, as well as credit card numbers, seat numbers and meals. The USA 
authorities may also demand information from the Advanced Passenger 
Information System, including gender, passport number and nationality of the 
passengers (Rathenau Instituut 2007). 
 The screening method raises several questions however as to how the PNR’s 
help to identify risks, what the substance of the precise procedure actually is, 
and whether the data are run against existing criminal data (Kuipers, 2008). 
There are several bilateral agreements which have shaped the basis for the 
exchange of PNR-data by airlines. These comprise the 2004 EU-US PNR 
agreement, in 2006 ruled by the European Court of Justice to be founded on the 
wrong legal basis (Balzacq 2008: 91); the 2005 EU-Canada agreement on API 
(Advanced Passenger Information) and PNR data; the 2006 EU-US interim PNR 
agreement (replaced by the 2007 definitive EU-US agreement on the submission 
of PNR-data), and the PNR agreement between the EU and Australia from June 
2008 (Kuipers 2008: 17f). 
 Foreign authorities can use these data of individuals travelling from Europe 
for the purpose of data-matching, data-mining and profiling. In the meantime, it 
has been ventured that these data have also been used to detect criminals and to 
control land borders. Hence, vast numbers of data are put on stock by 
American,23 Canadian and Australian authorities which demonstrates the 
increasingly dense information web and the way in which the EU has actively 
developed an external security link in its counter-terrorism policy. 
 Members of the European Parliament, privacy organizations, airlines and 
data protection authorities are increasingly concerned about the transmission of 
personal files without the approval of the relevant individual (Kuipers 2008: 3). 
One of the concerns is the potential function creep, i.e. the use of data for other 
                                               
22  United States’ Customs and Border Protection (US-CBP) and the Canada Border Services 
Agency (CBSA). 
23  On 14 July 2008, the American Civil Liberties Union ACLU announced that the US 
authorities had tagged the names of 400.000 individuals on the terrorist suspects list, 95% 
of whom are foreign or not a resident of the United States. 50.000 people were tagged as 
potentially suspicious with regard to (terrorist attacks on) air transport, while only 16 
names were known to the authorities when the 9/11 attacks took place (ANP Press, 14 
July 2008). 
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than counter-terrorism purposes, as well as the lack of reciprocity in the 
obligation to transfer data on passengers.24 
 
Europol 
Although Europol had been established before 9/11, its competences were 
extended considerably thereafter, partly as the consequence of a long-term 
programme for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, partly as an ad hoc 
response to large-scale terrorist attacks (Madrid 11 March 2004, London 7 July 
2005 in addition to the September 2001 attacks in the USA). After 9/11, Europol 
established a team of counter-terrorist specialists, later transferred to the entity 
SC 5 (Serious Crime), with – in principle – two Liaison Officers from each EU 
Member State, one from the police and one from the intelligence service. The 
team was requested to collaborate directly with American counterparts. 
 Furthermore, the Director of Europol was instructed to conclude an ‘informal 
agreement’ with the USA, which provided for the exchange of liaison officers 
between Europol and US law enforcement agencies: at present, the FBI, the US 
Secret Service, the DEA and the US Postal Inspection have Liaison Officers at 
Europol, while Europol has seconded two Liaison Officers to a bureau in 
Washington DC (Ratzel 2007: 289). In addition, on 6 December 2001 Europol 
and the US signed an agreement on the exchange of strategic and technical 
information, and negotiations were started on a supplemental agreement 
concerning the exchange of personal data.25 Hence, Europol has played its part 
in the post 9/11 tendency to blur the distinction between police and secret 
service intelligence, mainly by managing to overcome hitherto existing 
firewalls, the one being the gulf between police and intelligence agencies 
(MacVean 2008: 67), the other being the transatlantic gap. The question whether 
this has eroded restrictions to information-gathering and intelligence-exchange 
should be regarded as a prime subject for research. 
 The most important issue in the light of this paper is however the role which 
the agency plays in (electronic) surveillance. Europol bases itself on information 
which is made available by the Member States. Hence, the agency has the 
capacity for electronic data-storage and data-warehousing,26 and does so by 
means of its information system EIS. The analytical capacity of Europol implies 
systematizing and assessing the data, mainly through the European Crime 
Intelligence Model (ECIM), as well as in OCTA (Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment), TE-SAT (Trends and Situations Report on Terrorism), and 
                                               
24  The European Parliament rejected a former SWIFT-agreement (Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Programme) as it was of the opinion that the agreement was not in line with 
European data protection standards, represented an disproportionate invasion in people’s 
private lives, and was asymmetric in the sense that the EU does not require private 
financial data of American citizens to be analyzed for counter terrorism investigation 
purposes. In the meantime however, the European Parliament adopted a minor revised 
version of the agreement (8 July 2010). 
25  <http://www.europol.europa.eu/legal/agreements>. 
26  See Article 7 Europol Convention. 
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selected Analytical Work Files (AWF’s).27 Moreover, there is frequent 
interaction between the Europol database and other international data bases 
which contain information on criminals and their activities, such as the 
Schengen Information System, Interpol data systems and data held by Eurojust. 
The most salient aspect is the strong emphasis on (pro-active) intelligence 
gathering in combination with risk assessment strategies. Europol has a rather 
elaborate data protection system and is subjected to the control of the Joint 
Supervisory Board. In the new SWIFT-agreement which facilitates USA 
authorities to track terrorist financing, Europol shall even be entrusted with the 
task of controlling the data requests from the USA. 
 
The European Internal Security Strategy 
In the beginning of 2010 the EU launched its Internal Security Strategy, which 
aims at the development of a ‘larger consensus of the vision, values and 
objectives’ which underpin European internal security.28 As main objectives of 
the strategy a proactive, intelligence led approach is advocated that focuses on 
the prevention of criminal and terrorist acts before they can take place. 
Prevention and anticipation are emphasized, structured around analytical tools 
and early-warning systems. ‘A comprehensive approach must be taken that is 
geared to constant detection and prevention of the threats and risks facing the 
EU in the various areas of internal security.’ Further, the EU advocates a 
strategy of ‘responsibilization’: security policies must take a broad approach, 
involving not only law-enforcement agencies, but also ‘institutions and 
professionals at both national and local levels’, like schools, universities, the 
private sector and civil society organizations. One of the corner stones of the 
Internal Security Strategy is an accompanying Information Exchange Strategy, 
aimed at the timely access to ‘as much data as possible’. The model will include 
all the different EU databases relevant for ensuring security in the EU so that 
there can be ‘interaction between them’ for the purpose of providing effective 
information exchange across the whole of the EU and ‘maximizing the 
opportunities’ presented by biometric and other technologies. 
 
 
                                               
27  For Rules applicable to Europol Analysis Files, see: <http://www.europol.europa.eu/legal/ 
 other/files/Rules_applicable_to_Europol_Analysis_Files_en.pdf>. 
28  Council of the European Union (2010) Note from Presidency to delegations. Draft 
Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: ‘Towards a European Security Model’, 
5842/10 JAI 90, Brussels, 2 February 2010. 
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5. Conclusion: A Europe That Interlinks Polycentric Surveillance Practices 
 
The expansion of the European surveillance society is intimately connected with 
the growing popularity of the precautionary principle (crime prevention, 
preventive intervention in fragile environments). While emphasizing that our 
sketch may be far from complete, we have looked into some European strategies 
in the area of internal security co-operation and we have identified these as 
indicative of the rapid introduction of new surveillance measures in the field of 
EU homeland security. Despite the fact that ‘Big Brother’ critiques have not 
managed to obtain much cultural and political purchase in the fact of the 
‘obvious’ benefits of surveillance technology’ (Loader 2007: 32), several 
concerns have been voiced about the all-encompassing surveillance society. A 
few years ago, Privacy International conducted a comparative international 
survey in 47 countries and found there had been an increase in surveillance and 
an erosion of privacy safeguards. Of the EU Member States that were included 
in the survey, the United Kingdom scored lowest (primarily because of its 
massive presence of CCTV cameras, the number of which in 2002 was 
estimated to be 4,2 million, and the sizeable police databases containing 5,5 
million fingerprint records and 3,4 million DNA records). 
 Within the EU, the accumulation of surveillance measures is formidable, the 
speed with which measures have been adopted is impressive given their 
intrusive effect, the relative absence of controversy (public silence) is surprising, 
and the number of technological advances is hard to match with new data 
protection standards. Generally, however, one may argue that there has been a 
tidal shift in public opinion and checks and balances: governments have 
aggregated vast volumes of power and knowledge vis-à-vis their citizens. This 
process has been bolstered by the tidal concerns of the anxiety society in which 
organized crime and terrorism have been transformed into fluid and ungraspable 
demons. New legislation – in particular anti-terrorism legislation but also the 
development of administrative powers at local level29 – has restricted (the access 
to) rights in the fields of due process and data protection. 
 So is large-scale surveillance, coupled with transnational security governance 
(Johnston 2006), effective in what it seeks to achieve? The answers provided by 
the law enforcement community are mostly positive, to the extent that e.g. the 
electronic identification of vehicle license plates amounts to stops, searches, 
successful ‘hits’ and arrests. The collection of electronic data may also assist in 
reconstructing the movements of criminals and illegal transports or money 
flows. For the time being, although there is a strong pragmatic and technocratic 
aspiration to interlink surveillance practices for the purpose of crime control, 
there are several political, organizational, cultural and technological obstacles 
which obscure the realization of a panopticon from our view. According to 
David Lyon (2006: 4), the more soft and subtle ‘panoptic strategies’, the more it 
produces the desired docile bodies, or worse, perhaps, the absence of social 
                                               
29  For a discussion in the British context, see House of Lords (2009: p. 41). 
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reflection on the emergence of surveillance practices. Future research will have 
to generate empirical data on whether surveillance contributes to early detection 
of deviance, marginalization or radicalization, and whether this proactive 
information stops future criminals and terrorists in their tracks in an effective, 
efficient and legitimate manner. Alternatively, crime control and surveillance 
measures can be regarded as colonizing speech acts, meant to expand the 
regulatory power of governmental authorities over ‘deviant’ minds.  
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